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Divestiture as a Remedy in Private Actions Brought Under 
Section 16 of the Clayton Act 
In an effort to reduce the high degree of concentration and an-
ticompetitive activity prevalent in several American industries, Con-
gress enacted the Sherman Act in 1890.1 Congress expected this Act 
to end the threat of economic concentration which it perceived as seri-
ously endangering American political, social, and economic values. 2 
The Sherman Act, however, did not prove fully adequate in preventing 
anticompetitive activity, and Congress soon realized that further legis-
lation would be necessary.3 The result was the Clayton Act of 1914, 
an Act designed to halt restraints of trade in their incipiency.4 Section 
7 of this Act prohibits the acquisition of stock or assets where the 
effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create 
a monopoly."5 To aid in the enforcement of the antitrust laws, and 
also to provide relief to private parties harmed by violations of the 
antitrust laws, Congress created a private right of action in the Clay-
ton Act. 6 This private right of action is a powerful one; section 4 of 
the Act awards treble damages to a private party upon a successful 
showing of injury caused by an antitrust violation, 7 and section 16 pro-
vides for injunctive relief. 8 
1. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 
(1982)). Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in 
restraint of trade; section 2 prohibits monopolization or attempt or conspiracy to monopolize. 
2. See note 59 infra. 
3. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ~~ 147-148 (3d ed. 1981). 
4. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 
(1982)); see S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914); see also note 58 infra and accompany-
ing text. 
5. Section 7 of the Clayton Act reads, in pertinent part: 
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, 
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any 
part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any 
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly. 
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). As originally enacted, section 7 applied only to stock acquisitions. It was 
amended in 1950 to include the acquisition of assets as well. See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 
2d Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 4293. 
6. See notes 98-100 infra and accompanying text. 
7. Section 4 of the Clayton Act reads, in pertinent part: 
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover three fold the damages by 
him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
15 u.s.c. § 15 (1982). 
8. Section 16 of the Clayton Act reads, in pertinent part: 
Any person, firm, corporation or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunc-
tive relief ..• against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, includ-
1579 
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Courts disagree as to whether a private party may, under section 
16, bring a suit for divestiture9 of stock or assets acquired by a defen-
dant in violation of section 7. Some courts, perceiving divestiture as a 
drastic remedy reserved solely for the government, have denied this 
remedy to private plaintiffs.10 Others, emphasizing the broad lan-
guage of the statute and the court's inherent powers of equity, have 
held that in appropriate cases, divestiture may be granted to a private 
party.11 
This Note argues that private parties should be permitted to bring 
suits for divestiture under section 16 of the Clayton Act. Part I ana-
lyzes the language of section 16 and the relevant legislative history of 
the Clayton Act and concludes that Congress did not intend to limit 
the injunctive relief available to private parties. Part II argues that 
courts should be free to exercise their broad equity powers to grant the 
most appropriate and effective relief, including divestiture, to an in-
jured plaintiff. Finally, Part III contends that policy considerations 
disfavor omitting divestiture from the types of equitable remedies that 
a court may grant in cases where a plaintiff has proven a violation of 
section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
ing [section 7 of the Clayton Act], when and under the same conditions and principles as 
injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by 
courts of equity, under the rules governing such procedures, and upon the execution of 
proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that 
the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may 
issue .•.. 
15 u.s.c. § 26 (1982). 
9. "Divestiture" is defined as "the order of court to a defendant (e.g. corporation) to divest 
itself of property, securities or other assets." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 429 (5th ed. 1979). 
10. See, e.g., International Tel. and Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 
920-25 (9th Cir. 1975) (denying divestiture remedy relying primarily upon legislative history); 
Continental Sec. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 16 F.2d 378, 379 (6th Cir. 1926) (divestiture rem-
edy denied with little explanation: "Section 16 has never been held to reach such a case. The 
result sought is practically the same as would be asked for in a suit by the Attorney General."), 
cert. denied, 274 U.S. 741 (1927); American Commercial Barge Line v. Eastern Gas and Fuel 
Assn., 204 F. Supp. 451, 453 (S.D. Ohio 1962) (divestiture denied without discussion); Graves v. 
Cambria Steel Co., 298 F. 761, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (stating without further explanation "I 
cannot suppose that anyone would argue that a private suit for dissolution would lie under sec-
tion 16 of the Clayton Act"); Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 250 F. 292, 296 (D.N.J. 1918) 
(''The suits covered by [section 16] are limited to those seeking preventative relief .•.• [A]nd, as 
the relief sought in the present supplemental bill is not of a preventative character but to annul a 
consummated transaction, none of the venue provisions of the Sherman or Clayton Acts is avail-
able ...• ") (citations omitted). For a discussion of these cases, see Peacock, Private Divestiture 
Suits Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 54, 66-76 (1969). 
11. See, e.g., CIA. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. ARCO Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 413-30 
(1st Cir. 1985) (divestiture remedy permissible, based on extensive discussion of legislative his-
tory, policy and principles of equity); NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 
262, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1975) (rejecting Ninth Circuit's reasoning in International Telephone and 
Telegraph, but refraining from ruling on availability of divestiture since less drastic remedy suffi-
cient in this case), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977); Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. DIC Con· 
crete Corp., 467 F. Supp. 1016, 1024-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (allowing divestiture, relying primarily 
on policy and principles of equity). 
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I. STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
The proper place to begin a statutory analysis is, of course, the 
language of the statute. I2 Where that language is unclear or ambigu-
ous, courts often look to the legislative history for guidance. I3 A care-
ful examination of the language and legislative history of section 16 of 
the Clayton Act fails to reveal the clear legislative intent necessary to 
limit the courts' broad powers of equity. I4 
A. The Language of Section 16 
Section 16 of the Clayton Act explicitly provides that a private 
party may 
sue for and have injunctive relief ... against threatened loss or damage 
by a violation of the antitrust laws ... when and under the same condi-
tions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that 
will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity. Is 
No specific limitations on the permissible forms of injunctive relief ap-
pear on the face of the statute. I6 Focusing narrowly on the merger 
transaction itself, some courts have suggested that Congress intended 
the words "threatened conduct" to preclude private suits for divesti-
ture.17 This conclusion rests on the apparent assumption that once the 
merger is consummated, no "threatened conduct" remains to be reme-
died. Section 7, however, condemns mergers not only when they cause 
immediate harm, but also when they create a serious threat of an-
ticompetitive conduct in the future.Is The language of section 16 does 
not limit courts' ability to deal with this threat. Rather, it authorizes 
courts to grant injunctive relief in private suits in order to eliminate 
the potential for anticompetitive conduct resulting from an unlawful 
merger.I9 
12. See, e.g., Board of Govemers of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 
681, 686 (1986). 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399-408 (1973). 
14. See notes 44-53 infra and accompanying text. 
15. 15 u.s.c. § 26 (1982). 
16. Examining the language of section 16, the First Circuit remarked: "[W]e are first struck 
by the broad language Congress employed in § 16 .•.• Significantly, the statute states no restric-
tions or exceptions to the forms of injunctive relief a private plaintiff may seek, or that a court 
may order." CIA. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. ARCO Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 416 (1st Cir. 
1985). 
17. See, e.g., Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp. 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
18. See note 58 infra. The Ninth Circuit rejected a similar argument with respect to the 
availability of rescission as a remedy in government suits in United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co. of Los Angeles, 575 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1978). In that case, the defendant argued that the 
language of section 15, granting power to the government to "prevent and restrain" violations of 
the Clayton Act, only authorized the government to act against violations of section 7 prior to 
consummation of the merger. The court responded that this suggested limitation reads too much 
into the words "prevent" and "restrain" and is contrary to principles of equity. 575 F.2d at 230. 
For the language of section 15, see note 21 infra. 
19. The First Circuit argued that the language is sufficiently clear to preclude the need for 
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One must look, therefore, to the "conditions and principles" of in-
junctive relief to determine whether divestiture is an available remedy 
under section 16. As discussed in Part II, the distinguishing charac-
teristic of equity is flexibility; in granting injunctive relief, courts have 
broad discretion to formulate relief most appropriate to individual 
cases.20 Thus, although section 15 (the section of the Clayton Act 
which grants the Attorney General the right to seek equitable relief) 
does not expressly provide for divestiture,21 courts have often awarded 
this remedy in cases brought by the govemment.22 In that context, 
one would expect that if Congress had intended to exclude divestiture 
from the forms of injunctive relief available to private litigants under 
section 16, it would have indicated that intent explicitly in this sec-
tion's language. 
B. Legislative History 
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the legislative history of the 
Clayton Act in denying private parties the right to divestiture in Inter-
national Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. General Telegraph & Elec-
tronics Corp. (ITT). 23 The legislative history, however, is far from 
conclusive on this issue. On the basis of several scattered statements 
in the hearings of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the ITT 
court claimed that the Committee intended to exclude divestiture from 
the injunctive relief available to private parties under section 16.24 
The court felt compelled to admit, however, that "[ w ]hether Congress 
any further inquiry into the legislative history. CIA. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. ARCO Caribbean, 
Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 415-18 (1st Cir. 1985). The court proceeded, nevertheless, with an extensive 
analysis of the legislative history in order to refute the Ninth Circuit's contention in International 
Tel. and Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975), that the legisla· 
tive history suggests that Congress intended to exclude divestiture. Petro/era, 154 F.2d at 418-29. 
20. See notes 43-53 infra and accompanying text. 
21. Section 15 of the Clayton Act reads, in pertinent part: 
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to prevent 
and restrain violations of this Act, and it shall be the duty of the several United States 
attorneys ... under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity 
to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting 
forth the case and praying that such violations shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. 
15 u.s.c. § 25 (1982). 
22. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); United States v. E. I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961); Standard Oil Co. ofN.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 
1 (1911); Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 
(1982); RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). The 
district court in International Tel. and Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Tel. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 
1153, 1207 (D. Hawaii 1972), revd., 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975), reasoned that 
equity would demand that, since divestiture has been approved as an appropriate equitable 
post hoc remedy for enforcement of the prevention and restraint language of§ 15 and § 4, 
the same underlying equitable power and authority of the court should not be miserly with· 
held when by its use the court can make sure that the "threatened conduct" proscribed in 
§ 16 can never cause "loss or damage" in the future. 
23. 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975). 
24. See notes 27-31 infra and accompanying text. 
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shared this intention is not subject to rigorous proof."25 The Supreme 
Court has disapproved of this sort of speculation, warning that incon-
clusive bits of legislative history do not provide a reliable basis for 
determining congressional intent.26 
The ITT court pointed, in particular, to a statement made by Rep-
resentative Floyd at the hearings of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary. Apparently intending to speak for the Committee, Floyd 
claimed that "[w]e did not intend by section [16] to give the individual 
the same power to bring a suit to dissolve the corporation that the 
government has. "27 The court admitted that subsequent discussions at 
the hearings about the possibility of including "dissolution" among the 
remedies available to private parties under section 16 clearly indicate 
that Representative Floyd's statement did not represent the final intent 
of the committee, much less the intent of Congress as a whole. 28 The 
ITT court made an even more tenuous argument that Floyd's state-
ment suggests that the members of. the Committee understood the 
term "injunctive relief" as not including "dissolution."29 The court 
then argued that the Committee's rejection of an amendment which 
would have explicitly provided for the right to sue for "dissolution" 
under section 16 indicates that this remedy was not meant to be in-
cluded in the "injunctive relief" available to private parties.30 Ex-
tending this already speculative line of interpretation one step further, 
the court concluded that the Committee members thought "dissolu-
tion" to have the same meaning as divestiture· and, therefore, did not 
intend section 16 to include the remedy of divestiture.31 
25. 518 F.2d at 922. It is the intent of Congress as a whole that is relevant to statutory 
analysis. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
26. See, e.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 342 (1982) ("Reli-
ance on such isolated fragments of legislative history in divining the intent of Congress is an 
exercise fraught with hazards, and 'a step to be taken cautiously.'") (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft 
Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977)); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-
96 {1951) ("Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is inescapably 
ambiguous, and then I think we should not go beyond Committee reports, which presumably are 
well considered and carefully prepared. . . . [T]o select casual statements from floor debates ... 
as a basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended to enact is to substitute ourselves 
for the Congress in one of its important functions.'') (Jackson, J., concurring). 
27. Trust Legislation, 1914: Hearings on H.R. 15657 Before the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 842 (1914) (testimony of Rep. Floyd) [hereinafter cited as 
Hearings]. 
28. 518 F.2d at 922. 
29. 518 F.2d at 922. The wording of the section of the bill to which Floyd's statement refers 
was identical to the final wording of section 16. . 
30. 518 F.2d at 922 & n.45. Mr. Untermyer, a witness who testified before the Committee, 
suggested amending section 16 to read that a party "shall be entitled to sue for and have injunc-
tive and other equitable relief, including an action for the dissolution of the corporation and for a 
receiver thereof." Hearings, supra note 27, at 843. 
31. 518 F.2d at 922-25. The court surmised that references to cases in which courts ordered 
divestiture in hearing discussions on dissolution indicated that the committee members believed 
"dissolution" meant the same thing as divestiture. 
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Other discussions in the hearings cast considerable doubt on the 
Ninth Circuit's conclusions. The minority views in the Committee's 
final report, for example, strongly indicate that at least some members 
of the Committee thought that the injunctive relief provided for in 
section 16 included divestiture. The minority warned that section 16 
might allow individuals to sue for "a receivership" - the complete 
destruction of a company.32 Because divestiture is a less drastic rem-
edy than receivership, the members of the minority must have believed 
that section 16 would allow a suit for divestiture by a private party. 
Other Committee discussions suggest that the members of the 
Committee used the terms "dissolution" and "injunction" rather im-
precisely, without clearly understanding their meaning.33 It appears 
that the Committee members were simply not certain what the courts' 
equity powers included.34 In light of this uncertainty, it is surprising 
that the Committee would not have explicitly excluded divestiture 
from section 16 if the Committee members had ultimately determined 
that the private right should not include divestiture. 
The Committee may have rejected the amendment providing for 
"dissolution"35 for reasons other than to deny private parties the right 
to sue for divestiture. The Committee members may have (1) ulti-
mately concluded that the term "injunctive relief" encompassed "dis-
solution" (in which case the amendment would have been 
redundant);36 (2) decided not to give private parties as extensive a 
power as the government to bring about the complete destruction of a 
32. The minority report of the Committee stated that 
The provision giving to any individual the right to enjoin any threatened loss or damage 
.•. is a serious one. • . • The beginning of an investigation by the Government on any 
complaint that a concern has violated the antitrust law, almost immediately to some extent 
affects his credit, but not as seriously as an application for an injunction, and perhaps a 
receivership, which might be brought by any individual. 
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 10 (1914) (minority views to H.R. 15657). 
Statements in committee reports are given greater weight in statutory interpretation than are 
statements during the hearings. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 
395-96 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
33. For example, while informing a witness of previous suggestions that section 16 include 
divestiture, Representative Carlin said "it has been contended by some that we ought to give the 
individual the same right to sue for an injunction that the Government enjoys." Hearings, supra 
note 27, at 260 (emphasis added). Since the final language "injunctive relief" was also the word· 
ing of the bill at that time, Carlin's use of the word "injunction" here is inconsistent with his 
apparent beliefthat the section did not allow for divestiture. Perhaps he was uncertain as to the 
precise content of "injunctive relief." 
34. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 27, at 264 (witness Levy uncertain as to extent of common 
law right to injunction); id. at 652 (witness Brandeis testifying about the necessity of clarifying 
the courts' powers in equity); id. at 492 (Representative Carlin asking witness whether the bill, as 
written, would allow for dissolution). 
35. See note 30 supra. 
36. This possibility is supported by courts' continued willingness to grant the government 
divestiture relief, despite the deletion from the final bill of a similar provision explicitly granting 
the government the right to dissolution. See note 22 supra,· see also Note, The Use of Divestiture 
in Private Antitrust Suits, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 261, 267-68 (1974). 
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corporation;37 or (3) decided to leave it to the courts to determine, on 
the basis of common law principles of equity, the appropriate forms of 
injunctive relief available to private plaintiffs under section 16 (as the 
language of the statute would suggest). The committee hearings leave 
considerable uncertainty as to the Committee's precise intentions, and 
the majority views in the final committee report contain no discussion 
of whether the majority intended "injunctive relief" to include 
divestiture. 38 
The private right of injunctive relief was hardly discussed during 
the floor debates in Congress. On at least two occasions when it was 
mentioned, it was compared, without distinction, to the government's 
right to "enjoin" unlawful combinations. 39 While these statements do 
not explicitly indicate that Congress intended to grant private parties 
the same powers as the government, they fail to suggest any intent to 
exclude divestiture. 
Though the legislative history of section 16 does not conclusively 
establish that Congress intended this section to include divestiture, 
neither does it provide any basis to argue that Congress meant to ex-
clude this remedy. One can fairly say that the legislative history of 
section 16 lacks the clear intent necessary to overcome the strong pre-
sumption against limiting courts' powers of equity.40 This is especially 
true in light of the plain and broad language of the /statute.41 
II. COURTS' INHERENT POWERS OF EQUITY 
Because section 16 of the Clayton Act directs courts to grant in-
junctive relief to private parties "when and under the same conditions 
and principles as injunctive relief ... is granted by courts of equity,"42 
the interpretation of this statute necessitates consideration of the com-
mon law equity powers of courts. This section examines several cases 
which have emphasized the wide discretion allowed courts in granting 
equitable relief under federal statutes. 
Courts that allow divestiture as a remedy for private parties under 
section 16 emphasize the courts' inherent powers of equity. In CIA. 
37. The amendment proposed by Mr. Untermyer was in terms of a receivership. See note 30 
supra. The phrasing of the minority's disapproval of section 16 also suggests this may have been 
their objection. 
38. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). The Senate committee report is also 
silent on this issue. See S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). For the significance of this 
silence, see note 26 supra. 
39. Explaining section 16 to the House, Representative Floyd said "[h]eretofore there has 
been only one power that might enjoin an unlawful trust or monopoly in restraint of trade, and 
that was the Government of the United States." 51 CONG. REc. 16,319 (1914); see also 51 
CONG. REC. 9261, 9270 (1914). 
40. See notes 43-53 infra and accompanying text. 
41. See note 16 supra. 
42. 15 u.s.c. § 26 (1982). 
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Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. ARCO Caribbean, Inc., 43 for example, the 
First Circuit argued that while Congress is free to step in and limit 
courts' power to grant equitable relief in a given situation, a court may 
assume that Congress is aware of these inherent powers and only a 
clear expression of legislative intent will be held to limit them. 44 The 
court relied on Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 45 where the Supreme 
Court discussed the importance of courts' inherent powers of equity 
and the high degree of certainty in legislative intent necessary to limit 
these powers.46 The Porter Court held that a judge's ability to reach 
equitable results by shaping each decree to the particular circum-
stances of the case before it "is not to be denied or limited in the ab-
sence of a clear and valid legislative command."47 The Court 
emphatically stated a presumption against any such limitations: 
Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable 
inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that 
jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. The great principles of eq-
uity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences 
or doubtful construction.48 
The court's primary concern in equity, then, is to provide full and 
appropriate relief in the case before it. 
Interpreting the same statute49 in Hecht v. Bowles 50 as it had in 
Porter, the Supreme Court allowed the district court broad discretion 
in awarding equitable relief. The Act provided, in part, that "upon a 
_ showing by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is 
about to engage [in a violation of this Act] a permanent or temporary 
injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted without 
bond."51 Despite the Administrator's successful showing of a viola-
tion of the Act, and despite the apparently mandatory language of the 
statute, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's dismissal of the 
Administrator's petition for an injunction. The Court held, in essence, 
that the "or other order" language was meant to preserve for the court 
its traditionally broad discretion in granting equitable relief - even if 
that meant granting no relief at all. 52 Praising flexibility as the hall-
43. 754 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1985). 
44. 754 F.2d at 416-17. 
45. 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
46. 328 U.S. at 397-98. 
47. 328 U.S. at 398. 
48. 328 U.S. at 398 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 
(1836)). 
49. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23, 33, repealed by 
Price Control Extension Act of 1946, ch. 671, § l, 60 Stat. 664, 664. 
50. 321 U.S. 321 (1944). 
51. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23, 33, repealed by 
Price Control Extension Act of 1946, ch. 671, § 1, 60 Stat. 664, 664 (emphasis added). 
52. 321 U.S. at 328-29. 
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mark of equity jurisdiction, the Court concluded that "if Congress had 
desired to make such an abrupt departure from traditional equity as is 
suggested, it would have made its desire plain."53 
The same can be said of section 16 of the Clayton Act. As dis-
cussed in Part I of this Note, the language and legislative history of 
section 16 do not exhibit the "clear and valid legislative command" 
necessary to limit the courts' power to grant divestiture to private par-
ties. 54 In ordering injunctive relief under a federal statute, a court 
should seek to effectuate Congress' purposes in enacting the statute. 55 
Congress created the private cause of action in the Clayton Act to 
grant protection to private parties and to ensure more effective en-
forcement of the antitrust laws. 56 Allowing private parties to sue for 
divestiture provides an effective remedy to further these goals. 57 
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Because neither the statutory interpretation of the Clayton Act nor 
general principles of equity preclude the availability of divestiture in 
private actions under section 16, courts should look to policy consider-
ations to determine whether divestiture is a proper remedy for private 
plaintiffs. This section argues that the availability of divestiture in pri-
vate antitrust actions furthers important policy goals by enabling 
courts to remedy more effectively violations of section 7, while encour-
aging the consummation of lawful, socially desirable mergers. 
53. 321 U.S. at 330; cf Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), where the Court 
held that the Endangered Species Act of 1973 required that the court enjoin the completion of a 
multimillion dollar dam project in order to protect an endangered species of fish inhabiting the 
river where the dam was to be built. In this Act, Congress did not seem to restrict courts' range 
of remedies more than it had in Hecht, yet the Court concluded that Congress had limited the 
court's discretion in granting equitable relief. The Court relied on the legislative history of the 
statute which it said made very clear that Congress placed a high value on protecting endangered 
species. What is clear from the legislative history of the Clayton Act is that Congress wanted 
private parties to be able to protect themselves and to act as private attorneys general to aid in 
the enforcement of the antitrust laws. See notes 98-100 infra and accompanying text. These 
goals favor allowing private parties to sue for divestiture. 
54. See notes 15-41 supra and accompanying text. 
55. See, e.g., CIA. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. ARCO Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 428-29 
(1st Cir. 1985) ("[W]hen Congress uses broad generalized language in a remedial statute, and 
that language is not contravened by authoritative legislative history, a court should interpret the 
provision generously so as to effectuate the important Congressional goals.") (citing several 
Supreme Court cases); cf J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). Implying a private right 
of action under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Court in Borak said: 
While this language makes no specific reference to a private right of action, among its chief 
purposes is "the protection of investors," which certainly implies the availability of judicial 
relief where necessary to achieve that result. . 
. . . Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commis-
sion action. As in antitrust treble damage litigation, the possibility of civil damages or in-
junctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of proxy requirements. 
377 U.S. at 432. 
56. See notes 98-100 infra and accompanying text. 
57. See notes 66-82 infra and accompanying text. 
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A. Remedying Section 7 Violations 
In ruling on the legality of a merger under section 7 of the Clayton 
Act, a court must consider a variety of factors including market shares 
of the merging firms, industry trends toward concentration, degree of 
concentration within the industry, prior mergers by the firms in ques-
tion, and barriers to entry in the industry.58 Given this wide range of 
relevant considerations, each case inevitably presents unique problems 
requiring individually structured remedies to restore competition to 
the marketplace properly.59 Realizing that a remedy well-suited to 
one case may be entirely inappropriate in another, a court seeks to 
order that relief which will respond most effectively to the necessities 
of the case before it. 60 To achieve this goal, courts have available 
to them a number of equitable tools which they can use in various 
combinations to mold decrees that best fit individual cases. These in-
clude, among others, preliminary injunctions, 61 hold separate or-
58. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-44 (1962); Fl'C v. Warner Com· 
munications, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1984); Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 
F.2d 378, 379-80 (6th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). 
59. It is undisputed that the preservation of competition is the primary goal of antitrust: 
[The Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive 
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest 
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment 
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. 
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
Considerable debate exists, however, over how best to achieve the goals embodied in the 
antitrust laws. The "Chicago School" argues that competition and efficiency are the only goals 
of antitrust enforcement. These commentators would prohibit mergers or other business activity 
only where inefficient or anticompetitive. Other commentators question the assumptions of the 
Chicago School and point to aspects of American history which motivated the passage of the 
antitrust laws, as well as the legislative history of these statutes, which demonstrate that market 
concentration itself is a threat to social and political values. These scholars insist that antitrust 
law cannot be reduced to simple economic models to the exclusion of these other considerations; 
an evaluation of economic efficiency should not be the sole determinant of the legality of business 
conduct. This heated debate has generated considerable uncertainty as to the appropriate stan· 
dards for antimerger law. Compare Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1 
(1984), and Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else 
Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191 (1977), with Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A 
Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 41 (1984), and Sullivan, Economics and More 
Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214 
(1977). See also Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" 
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 661, 671 n.51 (1982) (listing the major books and 
articles on both sides of this debate); Cann, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuit of 
Economic "Objectivity": Is There Any Role for Social and Political Values in Merger Policy?, 60 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273 (1985). 
60. See, e.g., FI'C v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Hecht 
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)); United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Ange· 
!es, 575 F.2d 222, 228 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The equity jurisdiction of the federal courts traditionally 
has permitted the fashioning of broad and flexible decrees molded to the necessities of the indi· 
vidual case."). 
61. See, e.g., FI'C v. Warner Communications, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984) (prelimi-
nary injunction granted); Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982) (same); Sonesta Intl. Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 
247 (2d Cir. 1973) (same). See generally Note, Preliminary Injunctions and the Enforcemellt of 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771 (1965). 
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ders, 62 divestiture, 63 and, at least in some jurisdictions, rescission. 64 A 
court must have each of these remedies available in order to respond 
best to the particular exigencies of each case that may come before it. 
B. Divestiture as a Remedy for Section 7 Violations 
Because unlawful mergers involve a structural antitrust violation, 65 
structural relief, such as divestiture, is often the most appropriate rem-
edy. 66 The Supreme Court espoused this view in United States v. E.L 
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 67 saying 
[t]he very words of§ 7 suggest that an undoing of the acquisition is a 
natural remedy. . . . Divestiture has been called the most important of 
antitrust remedies. It is simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure. 
It should always be in the forefront of a court's mind when a violation of 
§ 7 has been found. 68 
A successful divestiture provides the greatest assurance that an unlaw-
ful merger will not lead to anticompetitive results. 69 
Despite the Supreme Court's favorable view of divestiture, several 
commentators have noted courts' difficulties in administering divesti-
62. See, e.g., FIC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (hold separate order 
made preliminary injunction unnecessary); FIC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(same). See also, notes 93-95 infra and accompanying text. See generally Note, Hold Separate 
Orders in Government Antimerger Suits, 70 GEO. L.J. 1337 (1982). 
63. See notes 9 & 22 supra; see also notes 66-82 infra and accompanying text. 
64. See, e.g., United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 575 F.2d 222, 227-30 
(9th Cir.) (rescission is within courts' powers of equity), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978); Arnett 
v. Gerber Scientific, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 770, 771-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same). See generally Note, 
Section 7 Clayton Act Remedies - The Rescission Decision, 64 CoRNELL L. REv. 736 (1979). 
65. A structural violation is one resulting from a change in the associations of participants in 
the market in question. This is generally distinguished from behavioral or conduct violations 
which result from conduct of individuals in the market. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF ANTrrnusr 23-25, 33-34 (1977). 
66. Elzinga & Breit provide a definition of structural relief: 
In common parlance structural relief is called "trust-busting"; the legal nomenclature is 
dissolution, divorcement, and divestiture. . . . Many experienced antitrust lawyers cannot 
draw the precise terminological distinctions between the three terms. Consequently, struc-
tural relief, and the "three D's" of antitrust, can best be considered in a generic sense. That 
is, they will refer to any effort to prevent or undo an antitrust violation through dismember-
ing or reducing the assets of the defendant firm. 
K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTrrnusr PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND EcONOMICS 
44-45 (1976). 
Conduct remedies, the alternative to structural relief, attempt to avert anticompetitive results 
by placing restrictions upon the defendant's future activity. For a comparison of structural and 
conduct remedies, see O'Connor, The Divestiture Remedy in Sherman Act§ 2 Cases, 13 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 687, 730-52 (1976). 
67. 366 U.S. 316 (1961). 
68. 366 U.S. at 329-31 (footnote oinitted). 
69. See Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948) ("[Divesti-
ture] serves several functions: (1) It puts an end to the combination or conspiracy when that is 
itself the violation. (2) It deprives the antitrust defendants of the benefits of their conspiracy. (3) 
It is designed to break up or render impotent the monopoly power which violates the Act."). For 
a discussion of the inadequacy of other forms of relief to accomplish these goals, see notes 106-07 
infra and accompanying text. 
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ture as an antitrust remedy.70 These commentators conclude that 
courts have been reluctant to order divestiture in the past and remark 
that divestiture has proved to be an ineffectual remedy in many cases 
where it has been ordered.71 The two complaints most often leveled 
against divestiture are the difficulty in finding an appropriate buyer for 
the divested assets72 and the problems in determining which assets to 
divest where the assets of the merged firms have become "scrambled" 
or have been sold or otherwise disposed of. 73 While these problems 
often can pose serious roadblocks to an effective order of divestiture, in 
cases where these problems do not exist, 74 or where they can be cir-
70. See, e.g., Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 
27 IND. L.J. 1 (1951); Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J. L. & EcoN. 43 
(1969); Pfunder, Plaine & Whittemore, Compliance With Divestiture Orders Under Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act: An Analysis of the Relief Obtained, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 19 (1972). 
71. One explanation commonly offered for the failure of divestiture orders is that judges are 
reluctant to order as complete divestiture as is necessary to remedy adequately the violation for 
fear of treating the defendant punitively. Adams, supra note 70, at 20; Pfunder, Plaine & Whitte· 
more, supra note 70, at 40. While the Supreme Court in United States v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961), ruled that antitrust remedies are not intended to 
inflict punishment, it also emphasized that a court's primary concern should be to order relief 
that will adequately remedy the violation. The Court directed that this consideration should take 
precedence over the hardship an effective remedy may cause the parties involved: 
If the Court concludes that other measures will not be effective to redress a violation, 
and that complete divestiture is a necessary element of effective relief, the Government can-
not be denied the latter remedy because economic hardship, however severe, may result. 
Economic hardship can influence choice only as among two or more effective remedies. If 
the remedy chosen is not effective, it will not be saved because an effective remedy would 
entail harsh consequences. 
366 U.S. at 327. For an argument that divestiture is often less punitive than other forms of relief, 
see O'Connor, supra note 66, at 741-49. 
Another source of judges' reluctance to grant divestiture is, undoubtedly, the uncertainty 
surrounding antimerger standards. See note 59 supra. 
72. The primary objective is to find a buyer whose ownership of the stock or assets in ques-
tion will not create antitrust concerns. Professor Kauper has noted this difficulty. "The search 
for a new purchaser of previously acquired assets may pose as many competitive problems as did 
the initial acquisition. Defendants may delay, assets may be changed or disappear altogether, 
and the market itself may be considerably altered by the time divestiture is acheived (if it ever 
is)." Kauper, Antitrust Relief and Innovation, SO ANTITRUST L.J. 71, 76 (1981). While 
problems created by the defendant's delay or misappropriation of assets can be resolved through 
greater use of sanctions for such conduct, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OP ANTI· 
TRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
reprinted in 80 F.R.D. 509, 611-12 (1979) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT], the ab-
sence of an appropriate purchaser may preclude an order of divestiture. But see note 75 infra for 
possible solutions to this problem. 
The fact that the defendant may be forced to sell on unfavorable terms should not deter the 
court from ordering divestiture if necessary to redress effectively defendant's violation. See note 
71 supra. 
73. See, e.g., FTC v. Warner Communications, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1165 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(where a joint venture called for the prompt sale of the acquired company's assets, which made it 
impossible to reestablish the acquired company as an independent entity through divestiture at a 
later time); FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966) (same problem with a proposed merger 
plan). 
74. This is often the case in a conglomerate merger where the acquired company is to be held 
as a separate company. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 869 (2d 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974). This may be true in the case of a horizontal merger 
as well. FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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cumvented,75 divestiture can be a viable remedy. 
Many commentators assert that past failures of divestiture are due 
not to any inherent inadequacies of the remedy but rather to its misap-
plication by the courts. 76 If properly applied, divestiture can prove to 
be an effective and efficient means of remedying a section 7 violation. 77 
Thus, while acknowledging the imperfect track record of divestiture, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed its approval of this remedy in Ford Mo-
tor Co. v. United States. 78 Concurring in that case, Justice Stewart 
pointed out that "while divestiture remedies in § 7 cases have not en-
joyed spectacular success in the past, remedies short of divestiture 
have been uniformly unsuccessful in meeting the goals of the Act."79 
Indeed, other forms of injunctive relief can impose significantly 
greater dilemmas for a court. In United States v. E.L du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., for example, the Court noted difficulties in policing 
conduct injunctions, burdens involved in litigation of contempt pro-
ceedings for violations of those injunctions, and the impossibility of 
designing a sufficiently detailed injunction to provide for all the ways 
in which improper conduct might manifest itself. 8° Commentators 
have reiterated this concern over the infeasibility of other forms of 
injunctive relief. 81 Given the serious difficulties inherent in alternative 
75. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 205-06 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as 
DEVELOPMENTS]. In appropriate circumstances, the lack of a viable purchaser may be resolved 
by ordering the divestiture in the form of rescission, see Note, supra note 64, or a spin·off (where 
the acquired firm is made an independent company and the stock distributed to the shareholders 
of the acquirer, if the acquirer is a large, publicly held corporation). See T. BRUNNER, T. KRAT-
TENMAKER, R. SKITOL & A. WEBSTER, MERGERS IN THE NEW ANTITRUST ERA 191-92 
(1985); CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 72, at 604-05. 
See notes 85-95 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the possible use of prelimi-
nary injunctions and hold separate orders to prevent problems created by scrambling or disposal 
of assets. ' 
76. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 70, at 33 ("The inadequacies ofpresent·practices are mostly 
self-imposed by the courts and the Antitrust Division: the solution to the problem is within their 
domain."); Pfunder, Plaine & Whittemore, supra note 70, at 129-37 (offering recommendations 
for more effective use of divestiture); cf O'Connor, supra note 66, at 772-75 (concluding that 
divestiture should be the presumed remedy in monopolization cases because it is more effective, 
easier to administer, and less harsh than conduct restrictions). The National Commission for the 
Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures agreed and offered recommendations for more exten-
sive and effective use of divestiture. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 72, at 600-16. 
Finally, now-Circuit Judge Posner has suggested that divestiture is a more workable remedy 
in section 7 cases (as opposed to monopolization cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act) 
because "[t]he mergers suggest the lines along which the firm can be broken up with minimal 
disruption." R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 84 (1976). 
77. Thus, courts continue to order divestiture in appropriate cases. See note 22 supra. 
78. 405 U.S. 562 (1972). 
79. 405 U.S. at 582 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
80. 366 U.S. 316, 333-34 (1961). 
81. See, e.g., T. BRUNNER, T. KRATTENMAKER, R. SKITOL & A. WEBSTER, supra note 75, 
at 196: 
Conduct restrictions are difficult to police precisely because they undercut the economic 
interest of a single corporate unit and try to curb activity occuring entirely within that unit. 
A divestiture order requires distinct, visible action; a conduct limitation invites constant, 
secret violation. , 
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equitable remedies, 82 courts should be reluctant to rule out divestiture 
in cases where it can provide the most efficient and effective means of 
remedying section 7 violations. 
C. Promotion of Socially Desirable Mergers 
Not only can divestiture serve as an effective means of remedying 
section 7 violations, 83 its availability can also promote the consumma-
tion of legal, socially desirable mergers. 84 This favorable effect results 
from courts' greater willingness to deny preliminary injunctions in sec-
tion 7 cases when divestiture is available. 
To avoid the prospect of breaking apart a merger after it has been 
consummated, a court may prefer to order a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting the merger once the plaintiff has shown a probable viola-
tion of section 7. 85 This solution, however, is problematic. The com-
plex issues involved in section 7 cases86 are not fully developed at a 
preliminary hearing, 87 so that a court might mistakenly issue a prelim-
inary injunction against a lawful merger. Because a prospective ac-
quiring company often abandons its merger attempt once a 
preliminary injunction has issued, 88 such mistakes could result in the 
See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 72, at 603-04; O'Connor, supra note 66, at 730·52; 
Adams, supra note 70, at 21. 
82. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text. 
83. See notes 66-75 supra and accompanying text. 
84. As Judge Friendly pointed out in Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 
F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974), lawful acquisitions, especially in the context 
of conglomerate mergers, can promote the efficient allocation of resources: 
Where, as here, the acquisition would be neither horizontal nor vertical, there are "strong 
reasons for not making the prohibitions of section 7 so extensive as to damage seriously the 
market for capital assets, or so broad as to interfere materially with mergers that are 
procompetitive in their facilitation of entry and expansion that would otherwise be subject 
to serious handicaps." 
498 F.2d at 854 (quoting Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 
HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1318 (1965)). See generally Y. BROZEN, MERGERS IN PERSPECTIVE 
(1982). 
85. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus., v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 698 (2d Cir. 
1973) (where the court ascertained that "if this Court permitted the tender offer to be consum-
mated and at some later date were to find the violations charged by A&P, it would be almost 
impossible to unravel the situation."). 
According to Professor Kauper, "[t]he best alternative is the preliminary injunction, a rem-
edy which by having an acquisition [prevented] prior to its consummation avoids a great many of 
the problems and frustrations of divestiture." Kauper, supra note 72, at 77; see also, Note, Pre-
liminary Relief for the Government Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 19 HARV. L. REV. 391 
(1965); Note, supra note 61, at 774-77. 
86. See note 58 supra and accompanying text. 
87. In United States v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 575 F.2d 222, 231 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978), for example, the court remarked that "numerous factors which 
have not yet been fully developed at trial may color the availability of relief against Aqua Media. 
The trial judge specifically noted ..• that he has not yet had the benefit of cross-examination and 
presentation of argument by counsel to develop a complete picture of the transaction in dispute." 
88. In Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974), the Secorid Circuit warned: 
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termination of lawful, socially desirable mergers. 89 
In cases where divestiture would be the only effective remedy if the 
merger is permitted and later found unlawful, a court faces the quan-
dary that any preliminary decision will result in a final determination 
of the matter if divestiture is unavailable. On the one hand, if the 
judge grants a preliminary injunction, the merger will likely fall 
through,90 thereby effecting a final decision against the defendant. The 
denial of a preliminary injunction, on the other hand, will result in a 
final determination against a plaintiff who cannot later seek divestiture 
of the merged companies. 
As an important element of its decision whether to grant a prelimi-
nary injunction, a court balances the hardship to the defendant if a 
preliminary injunction is granted against the injury to the plaintiff if 
the injunction is denied.91 Numerous cases demonstrate that the avail-
ability of divestiture influences this balancing. In close cases, the 
availability of divestiture will tip the scales in favor of denial of a pre-
liminary injunction, thereby reducing the likelihood of the undesirable 
consequences resulting from mistakenly granted preliminary in-
junctions. 92 
Allowing divestiture in private actions also enables courts to make 
effective use of another form of injunctive relief - the hold separate 
order.93 With a hold separate order, the court permits the consumma-
tion of the merger, but requires the defendant to keep all or part of the 
acquired assets as a separate and independant entity during the courst1 
of the proceedings.94 In cases where the court fears that the denial of 
Experience seems to demonstrate that just as the grant of a temporary injunction in a Gov-
ernment antitrust suit is likely to spell the doom of an agreed merger, the grant of a tempo-
rary injunction on antitrust grounds at the behest of a target company spells the almost 
certain doom of a tender offer. 
498 F.2d at 870; see also, DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 75, at 196 n.374. 
89. See note 84 supra. 
90. See note 88 supra. 
91. See Note, Standards for Evaluating Requests for Preliminary Injunctive Relief in Merger 
~ll~U~il~~~ · 
92. In Allis-Chalmers Mfg. v. White Consolidated Indus., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cerL 
denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970), for example, the Third Circuit commented on the uncertain status 
of divestiture as a private remedy and concluded that "[i]f divestiture is unavailable or uncertain 
as an ultimate remedy ... there may be even more reason for affording preliminary relief to 
appellant at this stage." 414 F.2d at 516; see Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea 
Co., 476 F.2d 687, 698 (2d Cir. 1973) (admonishing district judges to consider what remedies will 
be available later in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction); Electronic Specialty Co. 
v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969) (same); note 84 supra. 
93. See generally FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1083-87 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dis-
cussing the appropriate circumstances for the issuance of a hold separate order and its benefits); 
FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1973) (agreement of defendant to enter into a hold 
separate arrangement alleviated any concern about the impossibility of ordering divestiture at a 
later date); Note, supra note 62, at 1349-66 (discussing limitations and suggesting guidelines for 
proper application of hold separate orders). 
94. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1075 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
1594 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1S79 
an injunction and subsequent merging of the companies may make it 
difficult to order divestiture at a later date because of "scrambling" or 
disposal of assets, a hold separate order may be the most appropriate 
solution.95 In this manner, a court can safely allow a possibly lawful 
merger while reserving the possibility of an effective remedy should 
the merger later prove to be in violation of section 7. This potentially 
effective scheme of relief, of course, is only possible where divestiture 
is an available remedy once the merger is complete. 
D. Divestiture as a Remedy in Private Actions 
As part of its statutory scheme of antitrust law,96 Congress created 
a powerful private right of action.97 Congress granted this generous 
right of relief both to protect private parties suffering from antitrust 
violations and to encourage private parties to take part in the enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws.98 In Perma Life Mufflers v. International 
Parts Corp., 99 the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of pri-
vate actions, stating that "the purposes of the antitrust laws are best 
served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat 
to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the 
antitrust laws."100 Thus, private actions play an integral role in anti-
trust enforcement. And in section 16 Congress specifically listed sec-
tion 7 among the antitrust laws for whose violation private parties may 
seek injunctive relief. 101 Established principles of statutory interpreta-
tion dictate that courts should interpret section 16, a remedial statute, 
to allow all remedies necessary to further the statute's objectives of 
protecting private parties and enforcing the antitrust laws.102 
9S. Admittedly, a hold separate order is no panacea. In cases where a hold separate order 
cannot prevent certain anticompetitive consequences of a merger - such as exchange of trade 
secrets or other confidential information, reduced competitiveness of the acquired firm as a result 
of its uncertain status, or lack of economic interest on the part of the defendant to hold the 
acquired company as a separate entity pending a final determination - such an order will be 
inappropriate. But as one court noted, "absent such factors, a hold separate order may elfec· 
tively secure ultimate divestiture as an adequate remedy." FTC v. Weyerhauser Co., 66S F.2d 
1072, 1086 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Note, supra note 62, at 1362 (suggesting three types of 
situations where hold separate orders are effective); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 72, at 611 
(offering recommendations for more effective use of hold separate orders). 
96. For an outline of this statutory scheme and its enforcement, see P. AREEDA, supra note 
3, at 4S-102. 
97. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text. 
98. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 39S U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969) ("[T]he 
purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to pro· 
vide relief, but was to serve •.. the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws."). 
99. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
100. 392 U.S. at 139. 
101. See note 8 supra. 
102. See note SS supra. Also, private suits for equitable relief are in many ways less objec· 
tionable than suits for damages. The possibility of windfalls to remote plaintiffs, the threat of 
debilitating multiple recoveries from a defendant for a merger whose legality may have been 
unclear at the time of consummation, and the difficulties posed by the complex economic analy-
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Government enforcement agencies alone cannot adequately pro-
tect the goals that private actions were created to promote. The lim-
ited resources of the agencies make it impossible for them to 
investigate and prosecute all violations of the antitrust laws.103 This 
limitation, along with many other factors affecting the administra-
tion's enforcement decisions, may prevent the adoption of enforcement 
strategies104 which fully vindicate all the rights and values that the 
courts determine the antitrust laws were intended to protect.105 In-
deed, in deciding where to allocate their finite resources, the enforce-
ment agencies make judgments as to which areas private actions will 
serve as a reliable alternative source of enforcement.106 
Where the government fails to enforce certain antitrust laws, pri-
vate actions can assure that violations of these laws are brought before 
the courts. In this way, private litigation serves to further the develop-
ment of the antitrust laws. 107 In creating a private right, Congress 
necessarily intended private parties to play this vital role. Courts 
should not allow the government agencies alone to determine, through 
their enforcement policies, the substance of antitrust law.1os 
ses necessary for damage determinations do not apply to suits for injunctive relief. See Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261-62 (1972) ("[T]he fact is that one injunction is as effective as 
100, and, concomitantly, that 100 injunctions are no more effective than one . . . . [T]here is a 
striking contrast between the potential impact of suits for injunctive relief and suits for dam-
ages."); Schoenkopfv. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 210-11 (3d Cir. 1980); 
2 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, .ANrrrRuST LAW§ 328(a) (1978); Note, supra note 36, at 272-74. 
103. See Baxter, supra note 59, at 661. 
104. For the Antitrust Division's current policy on merger law enforcement, see DEPART-
MENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES, reprinted in 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1f 4490 
(1984). For commentary, see Merger Law Update, 53 ANrlTRUST L.J. 319 (1984). 
105. Commentators have criticized the current Antitrust Division's policy in this respect. 
See Flynn, ''Reagonomics" and Antitrust Enforcement: A Jurisprudential Critique, 1983 UTAH 
L. REV. 269 (1983); Litvack, Government Antitrust Policy: Theory Versus Practice and the Role 
of the Antitrust Division, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 649 (1982). 
106. See Baxter, supra note 59, at 691 (where then Assistant Attorney General Baxter says it 
may "be in the public interest for the Division to decline prosecution where an alternative plain-
tiff could prosecute and the Division's limited resources could be put to even better use in some 
other enforcement activity"). This is especially true where private actions have significant cost 
and efficiency advantages over government enforcement. See note 113 infra. 
107. Baxter places considerable reliance on private suits for this purpose: "To the extent that 
suits by private plaintiffs produce an efficient development of antitrust law, it becomes less criti-
cal for the executive branch to ensure that the courts have appropriate cases and arguments 
before them." Baxter, supra note 59, at 682. 
108. Sanford Litvack argues that the Antitrust Division has a duty to enforce well-estab-
lished antitrust laws: "While the shield of prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not intended to 
authorize categorical nonenforcement of the law simply because the prosecuting authority dis-
agrees with prevailing judicial interpretation of a governing statute." Litvack, supra note 105, at 
652. 
Professor Easterbrook recognizes that where private parties are denied the right to enforce 
the merger law, the substance of that law is in the control of government enforcement agencies. 
Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 705, 711-12 (1982). But 
Easterbrook takes a different view from Litvack. He argues that if current teaching suggests that 
an antitrust law is unjustified, the Antitrust Division should refuse to enforce it. Expressing a 
rather cynical attitude toward judicial precedent, Easterbrook maintains that "[w]hether these 
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Courts that deny divestiture in private suits appear concerned that 
private parties will not adequately represent the broader public inter-
est.109 The best response to this concern, and one commonly given by 
other courts, is that enforcement of the antitrust laws is in the public 
interest.110 Therefore, weakening antitrust enforcement by denying 
private parties the right to sue for antitrust violations has worse impli-
cations for the public interest than does allowing private claims. 
American common law tradition assumes that the determination of 
private suits in adversary proceedings will lead to the development of 
standards that reflect the public interest. 111 By allowing private par-
ties to sue for injunctive relief for violations of section 7, Congress 
directed that merger law develop in this manner. If a court believes 
that the opinion of an enforcement agency would be helpful, it can 
always request such advice.112 
While private parties may lack the investigative and evaluative ca-
[current] scholars are right or wrong, however, the objections to their position must be on the 
merits and not on the basis of precedent or a misty-eyed vision of a Golden Age." Id. at 708. 
Easterbrook's lack of faith in the courts' ability to resolve properly the difficult issues involved in 
antitrust cases leads him to conclude that "[t]his makes it a propitious time for the Division and 
the Commission to chart their own courses and lead the courts rather than follow them." Id. at 
717. 
This cavalier treatment of fundamental principles of separation of powers places the Antitrust 
Division in the position of law-maker rather than law-enforcer. If new learning suggests that a 
law is unfounded, the court or the legislature, not the Antitrust Division, should overrule it. A 
private right to divestiture can serve as a check on the Division's ability to usurp the role of the 
judiciary in establishing proper standards for merger law. Since private parties do not have the 
benefit of the advance notice that the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act premerger notification require-
ments provide the government enforcement agencies (allowing them to prevent unlawful mergers 
before their consummation), T. BRUNNER, T. KRATIENMAKER, R. SKITOL & A. WEBSTER, 
supra note 107, at 112, private parties can only enforce section 7 effectively if they are allowed to 
sue for divestiture of unlawful mergers of which they had no advance warning. 
109. Or, at least, that seems to be the implication of some of the summary statements with 
which these courts have dismissed the issue. See note 10 supra. 
It is not entirely clear why this should be of significantly greater concern in the case of divest-
iture as opposed to preliminary injunctions or permanent injunctions prohibiting the consumma-
tion of a merger (which section 16 clearly makes available to private parties). In terms of 
ultimate effect on market structure, there seems to be little difference in the result. 
110. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 699 (2d 
Cir. 1973) ("Since it is impossible as a practical matter for the government to seek out and 
prosecute every important violation of laws designed to protect the public in the aggregate, pri-
vate actions brought by members of the public •.. perform a vital public service."); Christian 
Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 600 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D. Mich.), ajfd., 
753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985) ("I find that enjoining the pro-
posed merger will not injure, and may well serve the public interest. Enforcing the antitrust laws 
of the United States clearly serves the public well."); see also notes 97-102 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
111. Cf Baxter, supra note 59, at 684-85 (where Baxter suggests that private suits arc effi-
cient as well as effective in this respect); Sullivan, supra note 59, at 1241-42. 
112. See, e.g., Private Enforcement of the Antimerger Laws, 31 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. 
SYMP. 239, 246-47, 262 (1976) (where two commentators advocate courts' requesting input from 
the government when necessary); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 72, at 613 (Commission rec-
ommends same). Baxter points out that the Supreme Court often requests the views of the gov-
ernment in private litigation. Baxter, supra note 59, at 700. 
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pacities of the government enforcement agencies, commentators have 
noted that a private plaintiff, through participation in the market in 
which the violation allegedly occurred, a business relationship with 
the defendant, or even through involvement in the alleged violation 
itself, is likely to have easier access to more accurate information than 
the government.113 Private parties generally have excellent expert 
assistance, 114 and in an adversary proceeding, both parties will have 
the incentive to develop all the relevant information necessary to a 
final judgment by the court. 115 If the court desires further assistance, 
it can request the opinion of a government enforcement agency, 116 hire 
full-time economic experts,117 or call on a professional consultant.118 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Where Congress has not expressly limited courts' equity jurisdic-
tion, a court should be free to exercise its inherent powers to the full 
extent necessary to provide the most appropriate and adequate remedy 
in the case before it. In creating a private right in the Clayton Act, 
Congress intended to provide protection and compensation to private 
parties and to ensure vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws. 
Courts should order divestiture when it is an appropriate and worka-
ble remedy to further these important congressional goals. 
- Paul V. Timmins 
113. See c. KAYSEN & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUSr POLICY: AN EcONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 119 (1959). Consequently, private litigants can produce this information at a lower 
cost to society. It may also result in higher costs to society for antitrust enforcement. As Assis-
tant Attorney General William Baxter intimated, "[private plaintiffs] who have prior specialized 
knowledge of the circumstances of the putative antitrust violation or the environment in which it 
allegedly occurred, may have a comparative advantage over the Division in the cost of and effi-
ciency in prosecuting a given case." Baxter, supra note 59, at 690 (footnote omitted); see also id. 
at 690 n.127. 
114. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, (6th Cir. 1981) (where Profes-
sor Scherer was Marathon's expert witness, and Professor Stigler testified for Mobil); White Con-
sol. Indus. v. Whirlpool Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (Plaintiff's expert 
witnesses were Professors Bower of Harvard, Sichel of the Hoover Institute at Stanford, and 
Williamson of Yale. Defendant's witness was Professor Klein of the University of California at 
Los Angeles). 
115. See c. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 113, at 118-19. 
116. See note 112 supra. 
117. One famous example of this was when Judge Wyzanski hired Carl Kaysen, then a Ph.D. 
candidate in economics at Harvard, as a law clerk while hearing the case United States v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). See c. KAYSEN, UNITED STATES v. 
UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION: AN EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST 
CASE (1956). 
118. Adams, supra note 70, at 33-36. 
